The winds of change are blowing. What could they mean for Australia’s sovereignty?

What Washington’s warning could mean for Australia’s sovereignty.

Beti Krsteski | Founder and CEO, Australian Nuclear Workforce & Industry Network

On 22 October, the White House issued a proclamation about wind turbines that Australia should read carefully.

Following a Commerce investigation, President Donald Trump declared imported wind turbines and their components a national-security concern. His administration adopted findings concerning cybersecurity vulnerabilities, radar interference, reliance on foreign components and the reliability implications of intermittent generation. It ordered trade negotiations and continued monitoring, leaving further remedies, including tariffs, available. [1]

The cybersecurity finding deserves particular attention. The proclamation identifies vulnerabilities in equipment, including networked inverters, that could permit remote interference with electricity generation. It does not establish that China possesses a universal switch for foreign wind farms or identify artificial intelligence as the mechanism. Its concern is that equipment supporting essential electricity supply could be accessed and disrupted.

For Australia, the significance extends beyond whether we agree with the President. Washington is examining energy equipment as a source of strategic exposure, with potential consequences for trade. We are making long-term commitments to infrastructure whose components, software and continuing support cross international boundaries.

We have already seen how an American judgement about supply chains can acquire an Australian commercial consequence. Since July, Australian goods entering the United States have faced a 12.5 per cent tariff, subject to exemptions, under action concerning the adequacy of forced-labour import controls. The wind proclamation is a separate measure, but the precedent for external pressure is already here. [2]

The underlying concerns did not begin in Washington. In 2023, our own NSW Anti-slavery Commissioner and Clean Energy Council acknowledged evidence of forced labour involving polysilicon for solar panels and cobalt for lithium-ion batteries. That does not establish the provenance of every Australian installation, and cobalt evidence cannot be applied to every battery chemistry. It does mean we cannot assume an energy transition is free of other consequences simply because its objective is worthwhile. [3]

What I see in this proclamation is another possible vulnerability for Australia: further trade restrictions, changing supplier requirements or security expectations that become harder to satisfy after our infrastructure is installed.

AUKUS gives that possibility considerable weight.

Can we have renewable energy, meaningful sovereignty and a reliable defence partnership together? Those objectives deserve to be pursued together, but compatibility must be demonstrated through the equipment, controls and operating arrangements we choose.

At the moment, the proclamation itself does not impose any new AUKUS condition. Nevertheless, if an ally regards particular equipment or access arrangements as a security concern at home, Australia should examine whether similar scrutiny could eventually reach infrastructure supporting shared defence ambitions.

The shipyards, maintenance facilities and industrial suppliers supporting our shared Australian, British and American submarine ambitions require dependable shore-based services, including electricity. Defence already recognises the challenge of assured energy supply. Its renewable energy programme also identifies solar, batteries and microgrids as potential contributors to resilience, with cybersecurity explicitly included. [4,5,6]

Australia’s Critical Infrastructure Security Centre already identifies concentrated energy supply chains, economic coercion, foreign legal influence and remote vendor access as risks. These concerns sit within our own government’s assessment of the energy transition. [7]

Australia is not approaching these risks without safeguards. Covered critical electricity assets are subject to cyber incident reporting and risk-management obligations, while industry frameworks and Australian Signals Directorate guidance support stronger security and recovery capability. The question is how effectively those protections address the equipment, supplier access and continuing support arrangements on which particular operations depend, and how that assurance is demonstrated.

Furthermore, the continuing development of an Australian offshore wind industry also adds new dimensions of complexity about location and coexistence with other activities, such as AUKUS. Government guidance explicitly recognises that future offshore wind projects must share marine space with shipping and defence. That warrants careful assessment of siting and operational requirements; it does not establish that a particular proposal obstructs a submarine route. [8]

Australia has prospered through relationships with both China and the United States. We should examine how comfortably those relationships can continue to coexist when technology, trade and strategic competition increasingly occupy the same negotiating table.

Equipment can be commercially attractive, important to domestic policy and increasingly sensitive to an ally—all at once.

Diplomacy remains essential. But diplomacy has more room to work when a country has practical alternatives. If we lack the expertise to assess a dependency, the rights to modify an arrangement or the capacity to obtain another source of support, our negotiating position becomes narrower.

This is where nuclear deserves a more demanding Australian conversation.

I believe nuclear will become part of Australia’s energy future. What remains unsettled is how much of that future we will be capable of shaping ourselves.

We spend much of the debate asking whether a reactor could be built, while giving insufficient attention to the expertise, institutions and industrial relationships needed to commission, regulate and sustain one competently. A future decision to proceed would not automatically supply the capabilities required to make that decision well.

I cannot say what every Australian renewable-energy contract permits under defence and AUKUS, or which rights operators have secured over software, maintenance and supplier access. Those arrangements deserve closer examination. As we consider future nuclear partnerships, Australia should identify early what its own people must be capable of operating, inspecting and maintaining, and which technical rights an agreement must preserve if overseas support becomes unavailable.

Who authorises software changes? What external connections are required? What technical information must remain accessible? What can Australian personnel do when supplier communications are unavailable, and what happens if the original company withdraws?

The lesson from infrastructure already installed is that dependence becomes harder to reshape once essential services rely on it. Future nuclear partnerships allow Australia to decide early what knowledge, technical access, maintenance capability and lawful alternatives we should retain. We should apply the same scrutiny to agreements being signed today.

Those questions require knowledgeable people on our side of the table before negotiations begin.

That is why I am building ANWIN, the Australian Nuclear Workforce & Industry Network: to help Australian professionals and businesses understand where they can participate, what standards they must meet and how international experience can develop capability Australia may later need at home.

The proclamation is a reason to look ahead and consider how changing security assessments, trade measures and supplier conditions could test Australian policies, leadership and industrial capability. Our response should be grounded in Australian evidence and interests, with enough practical competence to act on what we find.

A warm conversation between leaders can help manage a relationship. It cannot substitute for the expertise, contractual rights and alternatives that give a country room to act when the relationship becomes difficult.

We should pay attention to this proclamation for Australia’s sake. If competition between the United States and China tightens around the systems we depend on, we risk becoming the meat in a sandwich whose terms are being negotiated elsewhere.

The time to strengthen our position is while choices remain open. Before the next agreement is signed, we should know what we are buying, and what it will leave Australians capable of doing for themselves.

I would welcome perspectives from cybersecurity professionals, energy operators, defence industry and nuclear specialists. Which safeguards already give Australia meaningful control, where do significant dependencies remain, and what should we be negotiating before the next generation of infrastructure is commissioned? I am particularly interested in practical experience that strengthens—or challenges—this argument, without disclosing sensitive operational details.

Sources and further reading

[1] White House. Wind turbines and their parts and components proclamation. 22 October 2026.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/adjusting-imports-of-wind-turbines-and-their-parts-and-components-into-the-united-states/

[2] DFAT. Latest on US tariffs and trade measures. Accessed 28 October 2026.
https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/trade-and-investment/latest-us-tariffs

[3] NSW Anti-slavery Commissioner and Clean Energy Council. Modern slavery risks in renewables. 2023.
https://dcj.nsw.gov.au/legal-and-justice/our-commissioners/anti-slavery-commissioner/news-and-media/nsw-anti-slavery-commissioner-clean-energy-council-renewables.html

[4] Critical Infrastructure Security Centre. Energy Sector Technology Supply Chains. November 2025.
https://www.cisc.gov.au/resources-subsite/Documents/energy-sector-supply-chain-factsheet.pdf

[5] Australian Submarine Agency. Infrastructure projects. Accessed 28 October 2026.
https://www.asa.gov.au/projects

[6] Department of Defence. Operational energy transition. Accessed 28 October 2026.
https://www.defence.gov.au/business-industry/industry-capability-programs/operational-energy-transition

[7] Defence Ministers. Defence lighting the way on renewable energy. 21 February 2023.
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2023-02-21/defence-lighting-way-renewable-energy

[8] ENEC. Prime Contractor. Barakah programme.
https://enec.ae/barakah-plant/prime-contractor/

[9] GE Vernova Hitachi. BWRX-300 pressure vessel contract to BWXT. 27 January 2025.
https://www.gevernova.com/news/press-releases/ge-hitachi-awards-contract-bwrx-300-reactor-pressure-vessel-bwxt

[10] US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Backgrounder on Cyber Security. Regulatory overview.
https://www.nrc.gov/regulations-legislation/fact-sheets-brochures/backgrounder-on-cyber-security

[11] Idaho National Laboratory. Cyber security for microreactors in advanced energy systems. Research paper.
https://gain.inl.gov/content/uploads/4/2024/05/Cyber-security-for-microreactors-in-advanced-energy-systems.pdf